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SUITS BY STATE AS PARENS PATRIAE
Denial of indemnity should tend to motivate each director to police the
actions of the other directors out of self-interest. In an age of super-
corporations, the policy favoring a knowing, passive director over a
knowing, active one weighs lightly in comparison to the policy of pro-
tecting shareholders. For this reason, the court in Landoe reached a
questionable result by allowing recovery of indemnification by the passive
corporate director.
RICHARD L. GRIER
Federal Jurisdiction-Suits by a State as Parens Patriae
Although the right of a state to bring suit in a federal court was
expressly provided for in the Constitution,' a state, in order to have
standing, must have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation.2
Basically, the types of cases in which a state has capacity to sue have been
classified as proprietary suits' and parens patriae suits.4 Suing in each
capacity, the State of Hawaii recently filed an antitrust action, Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co.,5 in a United States district court against three oil
companies and an asphalt company. Realizing the importance of its de-
'U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, extends the judicial power of the United States to
cases "between a State and Citizens of another State," and provides that in
cases "in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction." Suits by one state against another are within the original and ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1) (1964). Suits
by a state against the citizens of another state are in the original, but not the
exclusive, jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (3) (1964).
Concepts of justiciability presumably apply equally to suits brought originally
in the Supreme Court and in a lower federal court; however, it may well be that
the Supreme Court, conscious of its caseload (e.g., Oklahoma ez rel. Johnson v.
Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938)), would apply different standards of justiciability
when jurisdiction by a lower court is available. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451-52 (1945).
2 E.g., Florida v. Anderson, 91 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1875). It is difficult to de-
termine from the cases to what extent standing is grounded in constitutional man-
date and to what extent in judicial policy. Clear-cut rules in the area are difficult
to find because "[t]his complicated speciality of federal jurisdiction . . .is in any
event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situa-
tions . . . ." United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S.
153, 156 (1953).
'E.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (suit on a debt).
'E.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (suit to enjoin the discharge
of sewage into interstate river).
301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969). Hawaii sued under sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964) and section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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cision to deny the defendants' motion to dismiss," the trial court certified the
case to the court of appeals.'
In order to sue in a proprietary capacity, a state must be in the same
position as a private litigant. It is established that a state is a "person"
within the meaning of the antitrust laws,' and states have been allowed
to sue in many cases to protect their proprietary rights.9 Hawaii clearly
had proprietary standing in the instant case because it was a purchaser of
the allegedly over-priced petroleum products."°
Much more difficult, however, is Hawaii's claimed right to sue on
behalf of its citizens as parens patriae. The right of a state to bring
suit as parens patriae was first articulated in 1901 by the Supreme Court's
decision in Missouri v. Illinois." Missouri, solicitous of the well-being of
its citizens, sought to enjoin Illinois from dumping sewage into the
Mississippi River. Granting Missouri the requested relief, the Court
noted that although previous state-initiated actions had involved dis-
putes over boundaries or proprietary interests, "[s]uch cases manifestly
do not cover the entire field in which such controversies may arise, and
for which the Constitution has provided a remedy .. ".."I' For when
"[siuits brought by individuals.., would be wholly inadequate and dis-
proportionate . . . ,,,1 the state is the proper party to protect the "[h] ealth
and comfort of its inhabitants."'1 4 Thus the state, as parens patriae, is able
to fill the vacuum created by the inability of private citizens to redress
adequately their possible injuries. 6
Following the decision in Missouri v. Illinois, Georgia was permitted
' 301 F. Supp. at 988.
IHawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 980, 981 (D. Hawaii 1969).
'Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
1 E.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (suit on bonds
of one state that were owned by another state).
I0 For discussion of standing requirements in private antitrust actions, see
Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
64 COLUm. L. REv. 570 (1964); Note, Antitrust-Clayton Act § 4-Standing-
Antitrist Violator May Be Liable for Damages Resulting from Over-Charges
in Sales by Non-Compiring Competitors, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1374 (1969).
' 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
12 Id. at 241.
1Id.
1
"Id. See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895) : "The obligations which
[the federal government] is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent
the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is often of itself
sufficient to give it a standing in court."
" But cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), in which it appears
no one had standing to raise the constitutionality of a federal appropriation.
Quaere to what extent Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), changes this.
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to go to court to protect the forests, vegetable life, and health of a five-
county area from sulphurous fumes emitted by a private industry in
Tennessee. 6 Describing the suit as based on the state's "quasi-sovereign"' 17
rights over the ultimate disposition of its natural resources, Justice Holmes
said that "the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain."'" By these oft-
quoted words, he shifted the emphasis from the inadequacy of private
remedies to the inherent power of the state as sovereign and intimated
that the state has interests beyond-and perhaps in spite of'--the aggre-
gate interests of its citizens.
In 1923, Pennsylvania and Ohio were allowed to sue "as representa-
tives of the consuming public"2 to strike down a West Virginia
statute requiring a locally preferential distribution of privately-owned
natural gas. There was concern that residents of Pennsylvania and Ohio
would be denied fuel. It was noted that "private consumers in each
State not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban communities
but constitute a substantial portion of the state's population. Their health,
comfort and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened with-
drawal of the gas from the interstate stream."'" The Court then added,
"This is a matter of grave public concern in which the state, as the
representative of the public, has an interest apart from that of the
individuals affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest but one
which is immediate and recognized by law.""
In its suit in Standard Oil, Hawaii relied heavily on Georgia v.
Pennsylvania Railroad," in which Georgia was allowed to bring suit as
" Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
17Id. at 237.
18 Id.
" Id. at 239: "Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing more
harm than good to her own citizens is for her to determine." See also Note,
The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV.
665, 678-80 (1959) for a discussion of the right of individuals and minority
groups in the state bringing suit to intervene because their interests differ from
those of the state.
"Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923).
2Id. at 592.
22 Id.
'8 324 U.S. 439 (1945). The complaint by Georgia alleged that the rates were
fixed so as
(a) to deny to many of Georgia's products equal access with those of other
States to the national market;
(b) to limit in a general way the Georgia economy to staple agricultural
products, to restrict and curtail opportunity in manufacturing, shipping and
commerce, and to prevent the full and complete utilization of the natural
wealth of the State;
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parens patriae against twenty out-of-state railroad companies for rate
discrimination allegedly violative of antitrust acts. The Supreme Court
in that case found that discriminatory rates "stifle, impede, or cripple old
industries and prevent the establishment of new ones. They may arrest
the development of a State or put it at a decided disadvantage in com-
petitive markets."24 To deny Georgia the right to sue "would whittle
the concept of justiciability down to the stature of minor or conventional
controversies." 25
It has been suggested that Pennsylvania Railroad departed from
previous parens patriae cases because it dealt with the protection of a
state's economic resources rather than its natural resources.20 Such an
analysis, however, does not seem to be accurate. To begin with, previous
parens patriae cases did not deal exclusively with the protection of natural
resources.2 7 Moreover, the proper concern in parens patriae cases is not
only with the particular subject matter of the controversy, but also with
whether an adequate remedy exists for the people whom the state repre-
sents. 28 Pennsylvania Railroad has timely importance because in it the
Court acknowledged the role of a state in protecting its citizens from
higher prices. In a highly organized and interdependent society, the
consumer ultimately bears the burden of higher prices, but usually is
unable to remedy his plight. He often must rely on the state to take
the proper measures that will ensure his economic security.
Pennsylvania Railroad is equally significant because the state as the
plaintiff in that case was permitted to take advantage of a federally-
created right in the capacity of parens patriae. It would not have been
exceptional for the Court to find that Congress did not intend in federal
statutes to give the states causes of action as parens patriae, as it would
(c) to frustrate and counteract the measures taken by the State to promote
a well-rounded agricultural program, encourage manufacture and shipping,
provide full employment, and promote the general progress and welfare of
its people; and(d) to hold the Georgia economy in a state of arrested development.
Id. at 444.2 1 Id. at 450.
Id. at 451.
93 U. PA. L. Rav. 442, 444 (1945) ; 32 VA. L. REv. 157, 159 (1945).27 In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), natural gas was
not dealt with as a natural resource, but as an article of interstate commerce
vital to the citizens of two states.
"The Court in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), was concerned not
only with the status of the states' rivers, but also with protecting citizens who
could not adequately protect themselves from diseases caused by the dumping of
sewage.
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'have been if the Court had held that a state could not protect its pro-
prietary interests in the same manner as a private citizen. Implicit in
the Court's opinion is the requirement of express Congressional intent
in order to deny a parens patriae suit to states even if a proprietary suit
is appropriate.29 While arguably limited to the antitrust laws, the holding
:may have ramifications in other federally regulated areas. For example,
it has been suggested that a state might sue as parens patriae to enjoin
the construction of a nuclear power plant sanctioned by the Atomic Energy
.CommissionY0
Because Pennsylvania Railroad and Standard Oil are substantially
related,3 ' Hawaii should have little difficulty in being upheld in its attempt
to bring suit as parens patriae. However, there are boundaries to the
concept. The trial court in Standard Oil set forth two primary require-
ments for a parens patriae suit: that a substantial portion of the inhabi-
tants of the state be adversely affected, and that the state have a direct
interest of its own concerning the matter in controversy.32
The first test is conceptually difficult because the extent of harm
33
that must be shown and the number of people34 who must be affected are
matters of degree.35 The court, however, had little trouble with the first
requirement because of the great importance to, and pervasive use of,
petroleum products by citizens of Hawaii.3 0
" "[W]e find no indication that, when Congress fashioned those civil
remedies, it restricted the States to suits to protect their proprietary interests....
There is no apparent reason why [parens patriae] suits should be excluded from
the antitrust acts." 324 U.S. 439, 447.So Telephone interview with Mr. Jean A. Benoy, Deputy Attorney General
of North Carolina, March 17, 1970. Another suggested example would be a suit
to enjoin termination by the Interstate Commerce Commission of train service to
parts of a state.
" In both cases suit was brought under antitrust acts. See note 5 supra.
" 301 F. Supp. at 986-87.
" See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
"See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
"Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11
STAr. L. REv. 665, 675 (1959).
"0 301 F. Supp. at 987: "[T]here is probably not a single industry nor more
than an insignificant number of persons in Hawaii whose operations, life and
livelihood are not connected in some way with, or affected by, the use of gasoline
fuel and the other petroleum products . .. ."
Plaintiff's fourth amended complaint alleged injury to the state because:
(a) revenues of its citizens have been wrongfully extracted from the State of
Hawaii;
(b) taxes affecting the citizens and commercial entities have been increased
to affect such losses of revenues and income;
(c) opportunity in manufacturing, shipping and commerce have been re-
stricted and curtailed;
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The requirement that the state have a direct interest of its own is made
difficult by the corollary that a suit by a state must not be a guise to
enforce the rights of individuals 1 or small groups of citizens. 8 In
Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,"0 a case factually
similar to Pennsylvania Railroad and Standard Oil,40 the Supreme Court
refused to allow Oklahoma to bring suit to protect its citizens and economy
from alleged excessive railroad rates. The Court reasoned that in reality
the state was enforcing the rights of individual shippers rather than the
rights of its citizens in general.
When the Court decided Pennsylvania Railroad thirty-four years
later, it expressly affirmed the rule in Atchison and distinguished the
factual similarity in a conclusory manner.4 Similarly, the court in
Standard Oil made only slight mention of Atchison.12 This result is
perhaps explained by the conceptual change that has occurred concerning
the role of standing in the antitrust field." Standing is a concept tied
closely to the substantive right claimed. As a policy matter, a major
function of a private antitrust suit, whether brought by a state or a
(d) the full and complete utilization of the natural wealth of the State has
been prevented;
(e) the high cost of manufacture in Hawaii has precluded goods made
there from equal competitive access with those of other States to the na-
tional market;
(f) measures taken by the State to promote the general progress and welfare
of its people have been frustrated;
(g) the Hawaii economy has been held in a state of arrested development.
Id. at 983-84. Compare this complaint with the one in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R,.
324 U.S. 439 (1945), reprinted in part in note 23 supra.
" New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (citizen assigned bond
to state and state sued upon it).
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1923) (farmers).
"220 U.S. 277 (1911).
Note Oklahoma's allegations and compare them with those in Pennylvania
Railroad, note 23 supra, and Standard Oil, note 36 infra. The state alleged that
it had
about two million inhabitants, is developing and building towns, villages and
individual farmhouses, and that lime, cement, plaster, brick and stone are
very essential to its growth; that at this time in the State of Oklahoma there
are very large and extensive petroleum oil wells, and the manufacture or re-
fining of the same is an industry continually growing in said State; that
the transportation rates on crude and refined oil, lime, cement, plaster,
brick and stone are very important and essential to the development of said
State; and, that the violation by said respondent of the said conditions of
said grant is a menace to the future of said State.
220 U.S. at 283-84.
"324 U.S. at 451-52.
"301 F. Supp. at 986.
"See p. 966 supra.
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citizen, is that it "supplements government enforcement of the antitrust
laws."" Recent decisions on the issue of standing have been consistent
with this policy. 5 Although under an expansive doctrine of standing the
possibility of a treble-damage windfall may attract suits with little merit,
such a risk may be justified by improving the enforcement of antitrust
laws. Moreover, the fear of sham suits would be less applicable when
states are involved, for, despite the potential for harassment because of
concentration of power and resources, state officials hopefully are in-
vested with better judgment and are checked by political processes.
Any ultimate reconciliation of Atchison and Pennsylvania Railroad"'
must answer an important question lurking beneath the concept of parens
patriae: Whether a state has standing to seek redress when private parties,
more directly concerned, can also bring suit. In both of these cases private
parties could have sued to enjoin the alleged discriminations in rate that
the states, as parens patriae, attempted to enjoin.4 7 Atchison intimated
that if an acceptable private remedy exists, a state may not sue. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad, however, indicated that a state may sue as parens patriae
if it has a legitimate interest in the controversy, notwithstanding the avail-
ability of a private remedy.
Because Hawaii's complaint in Standard Oil was for monetary
damages as well as injunctive relief, the issue is more clearly delineated
than in Pennsylvania Railroad or Atchison, in which only injunctive
relief was sought. In reaching the same result as reached in Pennsyl-
vania Railroad, the court in Standard Oil distinguished the possible
claims of individual citizens, for which the state cannot recover, from
the claims of the state.4 Such a solution is logical but begs the difficult
question of just what are the damages to the state, or, rather, what
"United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
"E.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
" One possible explanation of the practical inconsistency of the two cases is
that the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Railroad perceived a distinction that the
Court may have overlooked when it decided Atchison-the distinction between one
state suing another state and a state suing a citizen of another state. When one
state sues another state, the policy underlying the eleventh amendment buttresses
the case for finding lack of standing since it is more likely that in actuality an
individual is suing under the guise of the state. The main case relied upon in
Atchison was Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), a suit between two states.
See generally Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court,
11 STAN. L. Rv. 665, 677 (1959).
""Georgia alleged that the rate-fixing practices "give manufacturers, sellers
and other shippers in the North an advantage over manufacturers, shippers and
others in Georgia." Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 444 (1945).
" 301 F. Supp. at 986.
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are the state's interests "independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens."49  The court's failure to answer this question exposes an
anomalous situation: The court as a matter of law has concluded, for
purposes of standing, that independent interests of the state are present;
however, the court lends no aid as to the identity of these interests for
purposes of damages. Apparently the State of Hawaii also found this
problem troublesome, for after twice fully briefing and arguing the parens
patriae issue, she had not alleged the precise extent of her monetary
damages. 50
A recent suit brought by North Carolina may help bring about a
solution.5 Relying largely on Standard Oil, North Carolina has filed suit
against five drug companies for excessively priced drugs. Two types of
monetary relief are being sought: 200,000 dollars for loss of tax revenue
from the sale of taxed commodities that would have been purchased but
for the over-priced and untaxed drugs; and twenty million dollars for
general economic injury caused by the diversion of money by the drug
companies from the state's economy.
Despite the problem of damages, the concept of parens patriae has great
potential in the area of consumer protection. California, for instance,
recently filed an antitrust action against automobile manufacturers for
conspiracy to suppress the development of anti-pollution devices on auto-
mobiles.52 Cases such as those brought by California, North Carolina,
and Hawaii should not be dismissed for lack of standing. The parens
patriae concept, while not denying private substantive rights, gives the
public a voice in matters of utmost importance to society.
WILLIAM MAcNIDER TROTT
Income Tax-Charitable Contributions under the
Tax Reform Act of 1969
In a message to Congress on April 22, 1969, President Nixon em-
phasized the need for tax reform in order to "lighten the burden on those
who pay too much, and increase the taxes on those who pay too little."'
" Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
'o 301 F. Supp. at 984.
1 Telephone interview with Mr. Jean A. Benoy, Deputy Attorney General of
North Carolina, March 17, 1970.
" Telephone interview with Mr. Benoy, note 51 supra.
'Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5047 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
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